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We analyse how different labour market institutions - employment protection versus 
flexicurity - affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider both trade unions’ 
incentives to oppose or endorse labour-saving technology, and firms’ incentives to invest in 
such technology. We find that increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment 
protection and a higher reservation wage for workers - unambiguously increase firms’ 
incentives for technology adoption, even when taking into account the response in unionised 
wage setting to such new technology. If we assume that unions have some direct influence 
over the technology to be adopted, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing 
to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, since this 
increases the downside (job losses) of labour-saving technology. 
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The rich countries of the world are similar in so many respects, but labour market relations
di⁄er quite signi￿cantly. A dividing line is often drawn between the ￿ exible labour market
of the US and the more regulated ones in Europe. Sometimes the lack of European labour
market ￿ exibility has been denoted ￿ eurosclerosis￿(see, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990)
and given as a reason why Europe lags behind the US in a time of rapid technological
change and globalisation.
However, labour markets can be less than ￿ exible in many ways, and the economic
performance of European countries vary considerably. Many countries o⁄er employment
protection in various forms. This makes it costly to lay o⁄ workers, which is bene￿cial (at
least in the shorter term) for workers who are already hired. But too strong employment
protection can reduce the willingness of ￿rms too hire people in the ￿rst place, and the
work force can get stuck in old ways of production, with too little restructuring and
technological and organisational change. In the longer perspective, this could hurt even
the protected workforce itself.
￿ Flexicurity￿is sometimes seen as an alternative to employment protection. Flexicurity
purportedly exists in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and the key elements are little em-
ployment protection, good unemployment insurance (and other means of income support
for people outside the labour market), and an emphasis on labour market training and
skill development to ease (re)entry into paid work.1
Flexicurity has become somewhat of a buzzword among policy makers. For example,
the 2005 Employment Outlook (OECD, 2005) recommends countries as Germany and
France to adopt a labour market model inspired by Denmark. There is also an up-start
economics literature that discusses ￿ exicurity and employment protection within formal
models, something we shall return to.
The present paper is also an attempt to employ formal economic modelling to get
1Some claim that the ￿ exicurity concept should be reserved as a description of the Danish labour
market only, since Denmark has less employment protection than some other candidate countries with
high unemployment insurance and active labour market policies (Andersen and Svarer, 2006).
2to grips with the ￿ exicurity debate. A salient feature of the model is that workers are
unionised. Those countries where authorities try to regulate the income security of workers,
by employment protection, high unemployment insurance bene￿ts, or the like, are typically
countries also with other deviations from free, competitive labour markets, with trade
unionism as a prime example. Trade unions are still important in most West-European
economies. Membership rates may have fallen in some countries, but coverage ￿ the
number of workers covered by a union wage agreement ￿has fallen much less.2 The UK is
perhaps the prime example of a country where unions markedly have been losing in￿ uence
over the last couple of decades, but even for this country it can be asked if unions ￿ have
turned the corner￿?3 Notice also that trade unionism remains strong in those countries
that are foremostly associated with ￿ exicurity, as the Scandinavian countries. We therefore
think it is interesting to ask how regulations as employment protection and unemployment
bene￿ts interact with unionised wage setting.
￿ Flexibility￿in the labour market is a rather vague concept that can be given many
interpretations. One could perhaps delineate between ￿ external ￿ exibility￿ , which would
refer to allocation and reallocation of workers among ￿rms and sectors ￿and ￿ internal ￿ ex-
ibility￿ , which would concern the willingness to accept new technology, to skill upgrading
and the like within the existing workplaces. In our formal model, what we think of as
￿ exibility is the adoption of new labour-saving technologies in ￿rms, which in this usage
of language would be an example of￿ internal ￿ exibility￿ . Within a uni￿ed framework, we
take two di⁄erent approaches to studying incentives for technology adoption in unionised
￿rms. First, we consider the incentives for trade unions to oppose the implementation
of (exogenously arriving) labour-saving innovations. Our starting point is the reasonable
assumption that trade unions have some in￿ uence on the use of technology, and we then
exaggerate this by assuming that the union can veto the adoption of any technology that
is not in the best interest of the union membership. As in Dowrick and Spencer (1994)
and Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2006), this is a stylised way to capture that unions
2For documentation, see OECD (1997) and EEAG (2004).
3Blanden, Machin and Van Reenen (2006).
3￿being concerned about job losses among their members ￿can use their collective power
to, if not permanently block, then at least signi￿cantly delay, and make more costly, the
adoption of labour-saving technology. This is typically done by, e.g., refusing to concede
to the changes in manning rules, remuneration systems and the like that new technology
requires.4
In the second part of the analysis, we use the assumption that technology is endogenous:
the ￿rm can install labour-saving technology at a cost, but takes into account the wage
response of the trade union. The in￿ uence of the union is here only indirect: it has no
means to in￿ uence technology choices directly, but its in￿ uence over wage setting will
possibly change technology adoption indirectly. In this part, we also analyse the ￿rm￿ s
willingness to undertake risky investments in technology improvements.
A key question in the paper is if each of the two legs of a ￿ exicurity policy, income
protection for the unemployed or employment protection is good or bad for technology
adoption. We investigate how two parameters, an employment protection variable (the
cost of laying people o⁄) and a reservation wage variable (the utility of unionised workers
outside the ￿rm in question), a⁄ect technology adoption. We interpret ￿ ￿ exicurity￿as an
increase in the reservation wage and a decrease in employment protection. As forewarned,
we are foremostly interested in how ￿ exicurity in￿ uences adoption of labour-saving tech-
nological advances.
Our results suggest that ￿ exicurity is unambiguously good for technology adoption if
we only consider ￿rm incentives, that is, the case where union in￿ uence only is indirect and
works through the wage setting process. The increase in reservation wage and the decrease
in employment protection both contribute to making the ￿rm more willing to invest in new
labour-saving technology. However, the same unambiguous conclusion cannot be reached
if we focus on union incentives directly to block technology adoption. While better outside
options will make unions more technology-friendly, reduced employment protection ￿the
other leg of the ￿ exicurity system ￿has the opposite e⁄ect. The reason is that employment
4See, e.g., Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Lommerud et al. (2006) for comprehensive analyses and
discussions ￿ including many empirical and anectodal examples ￿ of such ￿ rational Luddism￿ by trade
unions.
4protection softens the downside of labour-saving technology, namely job losses, and there-
fore makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Thus, whether ￿ exicurity
is good for technological change depends on which party is more important for technology
adoption in unionised economies: ￿rms or trade unions, or put di⁄erently, to which extent
unions can block or postpone the adoption of technology directly.
The ￿ exicurity debate is often presented as a comparison of two European models. Less
often is ￿ exicurity compared with a non-interference type labour market as the US one. If
one takes the existence of at least some union power as a starting point, our results suggest
that non-interference is not a solution that best stimulates technology adoption. On the
contrary, introducing minimum wages or social insurance that lifts the reservation wage
of workers that lose their jobs ￿from the non-interference level ￿encourages technology
adoption.
The pre-existing academic economics literature on the ￿ exicurity vs. employment
protection debate is small, and little focussed on technology choices, but more on issues
we have dubbed ￿ external ￿ exibility￿ , such as structural change. Nevertheless, we would
like to mention some related work. First we would want to point out the link to the debate
in the Nordic trade union movement, spurred by the two Swedish trade union economists
G￿sta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner (see Turvey, 1952). They argued that it was important
to keep wages up in traditional industry, to increase the rate of structural change and
modernization. On the other hand, unemployment insurance and active labour market
policies should be used to ease the situation for workers who lost their jobs and to speed
up their re-entry into the labour market.5
One important ingredient in the ￿ exicurity debate is unemployment insurance. Ace-
moglu and Shimer (2000) point out that unemployment insurance can yield productivity
gains. In particular, insurance can motivate workers to move to higher productivity jobs
and also motivate ￿rms to create those jobs. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2008) charac-
5Agell and Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) provide two di⁄erent attempts at
capturing these ideas in neoclassical economics models. Staiger (1988) provides a somewhat related model,
where unions drive out the most labour-intensive production to other countries, something which enables
the union to take out a higher union rent.
5terise optimal unemployment insurance when workers can move and/or retrain, and ￿nd
that the classical result that bene￿ts should fall with unemployment duration no longer
necessarily holds. Both of the latter papers picture ￿ ￿ exibility￿to mean structural and ge-
ographical mobility in the labour market, in contrast to our emphasis on the installment of
labour-saving technology. The other important ingredient in ￿ exicurity is the reduction of
employment protection. Bertola (2004) gives an overview of the debate on labour market
institutions in Europe, with one emphasis on the consequences of employment protection.
His focus is on structural change, rather than technology adoption.6
Blanchard and Tirole (2008) study the optimal design both of unemployment insurance
and employment protection. In a ￿rst-best version of the model they ￿nd that unemploy-
ment insurance always should be accompanied by employment protection ￿and go on
to discuss various deviations from this ￿rst-best model. We do not study the joint opti-
mality of unemployment insurance and employment protection, but instead focus on the
positive question how more unemployment insurance and less employment protection in-
￿ uence the adoption of new technology. Blanchard and Tirole do not focus on technology
adoption, and trade unions are not mentioned. Algan and Cahuc (2006) postulate that
the tendency to cheat on unemployment insurance programmes is larger in some countries
than in others. This can make ￿ exicurity the optimal choice for some Northern European
countries, while it is not necessarily optimal to copy this policy in countries closer to the
Mediterranean.7
Finally, we would like to draw attention to the relatively large literature on how trade
unionism in￿ uence the technology choices of the ￿rm. See, for example, Tauman and
Weiss (1987), Ulph and Ulph (1998), Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) and Haucap
and Wey (2004). There is no mention of ￿ exicurity in these papers.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The basic model is presented in the next
section. In Section 3, we analyse the labour market e⁄ects of installing new labour-saving
6Ichino and Riphahn (2005) discuss employment protection in the context of absenteeism. Dewit,
Leahy and Montagna (2003) and Kessing (2006) discuss the possible strategic advantages from employment
protection ￿building on the key insight that a ￿rm that only costly can get rid of its workers, will ￿ght
harder to retain market shares.
7Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2006) bring political economy elements into the ￿ exicurity debate.
6technology. In Section 4, we analyse union incentives to oppose exogenous technological
change, while, in Section 5, we endogenise the technological change by analysing ￿rm
incentives for technology investments. The paper is concluded by Section 6.
2 Model
In order to focus on the strategic ￿rm-union relationship, we place the analysis in a simple
dynamic framework. A unionised ￿rm exists for two periods. In both periods, wages are
set by a monopoly trade union, while employment is set by the ￿rm. In the second period,
a new labour-saving technology may or may not become available for the ￿rm to adopt. If
the new technology becomes available, the presence of employment protection legislation
makes employment downsizing costly for the ￿rm.
The ￿rm is a monopolist in its product market, where demand is equal in both periods.
The inverse demand function is given by the linear form
p(qi) = ￿ ￿ ￿qi; (1)
where qi is produced quantity in period i. Labour is the only factor of production in a
simple linear technology. Denoting employment in period i by Li, produced output in the
￿rst period is given by
q1 = L1; (2)





L2 without new technolgy
￿L2 with new technology
; (3)
where ￿ > 1. Thus, the parameter ￿ measures the potential technological progress between
the two periods.
7With the above assumptions, pro￿ts in period 1 and 2, respectively, are given by





p(q2)q2 ￿ w2L2 ￿ c(L1 ￿ L2) if L2 < L1
p(q2)q2 ￿ w2L2 if L2 ￿ L1
: (5)
The degree of employment protection is given by the parameter c > 0, in the case of
second-period downsizing of employment.8;9
Trade union objectives are given by the following Stone-Geary-type utility function for
period i:
Ui = (wi ￿ b)
￿ Li; (6)
where ￿ > 0 is a measure of the degree of wage orientation in union preferences10, while
b > 0 is the reservation (reference) wage level. It is reasonable, and standard, to assume
that b re￿ ects both opportunities outside the ￿rm (e.g., the minimum wage level) and
outside the labour market (e.g., unemployment bene￿ts).
The union sets wages prior to the ￿rm￿ s employment decision in each of the two peri-
ods and we solve the game by backwards induction, looking for a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. In the next section, we start by deriving the equilibrium
outcomes of the second-period subgames (for the cases with and without technological
change). Subsequently, we will provide two di⁄erent approaches to analysing techno-
logical progress between the two periods. First, we assume that the arrival of the new
technology is exogenous and we analyse the trade union￿ s incentive to oppose exogenous
technological change. Second, we endogenise the technological progress and analyse the
￿rm￿ s incentive to invest in new labour-saving technologies, but taken into account that
8We focus on the red tape component of employment protection legislation. As noted by Boeri et al.
(2006), both empirical evidence (Bertola et al, 2000) and economic theory (Lazear, 1990) suggest that it
is mainly red tape and procedural costs that a⁄ect employment ￿ ows.
9As pointed out by Bentolila and Bertola (1990), the e⁄ects of employment protection laws are arguably
best approximated by a ￿xed ￿ring cost per worker, implying linear employment downsizing costs.
10The parameter ￿ can indirectly be interpreted as the degree of ￿ insider￿domination. A trade union
that is more dominated by insiders will typically give more importance to wages (all else equal).
8technology choices in￿ uence the wage level set by the union.
3 Labour market e⁄ects of technological change
In this section, we derive the equilibrium outcomes of the second-period subgames and
analyse how new technology a⁄ects wages and employment. There are two subgames, one
where the new labour-saving technology is available and one where it is not.
3.1 No new technology
With the old technology, the ￿rm has no incentive to downsize production in the second
period. Maximising the second-period pro￿t function with respect to L2, and assuming





The trade union maximises its second-period utility by choosing a wage level that optimally
balances the concerns for wages and employment. Inserting (7) into (6) and maximising





As expected, the wage is increasing in the wage orientation of the union (￿) and in the




2￿ (￿ + 1)
: (9)
3.2 New technology
We focus on the case of labour-saving innovations, implying that employment is downsized.
Maximising the second-period pro￿t function with respect to L2, and assuming that L2 <
11We use "hats" to denote equilibrium second-period values in the case of no technological progress.
9L1, second period labour demand is given by
L2 (w2) =
￿￿ ￿ w2 + c
2￿￿2 : (10)
Naturally, given the ￿rm￿ s incentives for employment downsizing, the presence of employ-
ment protection (c > 0) makes second-period labour demand higher than it would have
been in the absence of such legislation. In other words, employment protection makes
second-period labour demand more inelastic, making the wage/employment trade-o⁄more
favourable for the trade union. Inserting L2 (w2) from (10) into (6) and maximising with
respect to w2 yields
w￿
2 =
￿(￿￿ + c) + b
1 + ￿
: (11)
As indicated above, stronger employment protection increases the wage level in a situa-
tion where the ￿rm has incentives to downsize employment. Notice also that, since an
increase in ￿ makes labour demand less responsive to wage changes,12 there is a negative
relationship between labour productivity and labour demand elasticity. Consequently,




￿￿ ￿ b + c
2￿￿2 (￿ + 1)
: (12)
4 Exogenous technological change
Assume that the new technology arrives in the second period with an exogenous (and
known) probability ￿ 2 (0;1). Both the ￿rm and the trade union make their ￿rst-period
choices by maximising the sum of ￿rst- and (expected) second-period payo⁄s. For sim-
plicity, we abstract from discounting.









10Expected pro￿ts over the two periods are given by
￿ = ￿1 + ￿￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿2: (13)
Maximising this expression with respect to L1 yields the following ￿rst-period labour
demand:
L1 (w1) =
￿ ￿ ￿c ￿ w1
2￿
: (14)
Notice the negative relationship between ￿rst-period labour demand and the two parame-
ters ￿ and c. The more likely it is that the ￿rm wants to downsize employment in the second
period, and the more costly such downsizing is, the lower is ￿rst-period labour demand.
This consequently increases the wage elasticity of labour demand in the ￿rst-period.
Expected union utility over the two periods is given by
V = U1 + ￿U2 + (1 ￿ ￿) b U2; (15)
which, after substitution and maximisation, gives the optimal ￿rst-period wage
w￿
1 =
￿(￿ ￿ ￿c) + b
￿ + 1
; (16)
with a corresponding employment level
L￿
1 =
￿ ￿ b ￿ ￿c
2￿ (￿ + 1)
: (17)
The e⁄ect of employment protection on wages and employment di⁄ers diametrically
in the ￿rst and second period. Stronger employment protection implies that it is more
costly for the ￿rm to operate with a large workforce in the ￿rst period, given the incentives
for second-period downsizing. Thus, stronger employment protection yields lower labour
demand in the ￿rst period. In other words, the positive e⁄ect on employment in the second
period is counteracted by a negative ￿rst-period e⁄ect, with a corresponding wage e⁄ect.
11This illustrates ￿in a very simple framework ￿the standard concern about the dynamic
employment e⁄ects of employment protection legislation: if the cost of laying o⁄ workers
is increased, this will make ￿rms less willing to hire workers in the ￿rst place.
The above results are derived under the assumption that L2 < L1 if the new labour-
saving technology appears. It remains to show that this condition holds in equilibrium.
Comparing (12) and (17), it can easily be shown that the condition holds if the technolog-
ical progress is su¢ ciently large relative to downsizing costs.13 Notice also that L￿
1 < b L2
as long as expected downsizing costs (￿c) are positive. Thus, we consider the case where
L￿
2 < L￿
1 < b L2.
4.1 Union resistance to technological change
Will the new labour-saving technology be adopted in the second-period? Giving the trade
union the power to veto any adoption of new technology, this question is answered by a
comparison of second-period union utility with and without new technology. Denoting the
utility gain of new technology by ￿U = U2 ￿ b U2, this is given by
￿U =
￿￿￿
2￿￿2 (￿ + 1)
1+￿; (18)
where
￿ = (￿￿ ￿ b + c)
￿+1 ￿ ￿2 (￿ ￿ b)
￿+1 :
Proposition 1 Given that the adoption of new technology leads to employment downsiz-
ing, there exists a critical value ￿￿, such that ￿U > (<)0 if ￿ > (<)￿￿.
Proof. Notice ￿rst that sign(￿U) = sign(￿). If ￿ = 0, ￿ < 0 if L￿
2 < L￿
1 < b L2 (the
employment downsizing regime). Furthermore, since ￿￿￿b+c > ￿￿b, ￿ is monotonically
increasing in ￿. Finally, since ￿ is not bounded from above, ￿ > 0 for su¢ ciently high













12Labour-saving innovations present the union with the following trade-o⁄: fewer of the
union members are employed by the ￿rm, but the remaining workers can enjoy higher
wages. How this trade-o⁄ is assessed depends on the union preferences for wages relative
to employment. In the extreme case where the union only cares about employment (￿ = 0),
a labour-saving innovation is always detrimental to the union, since it does not care about
the wage increase that accompanies the job losses. In the other extreme case, where the
union only cares about wages (￿ ! 1), a labour-saving innovation is always bene￿cial to
the union, since it does not care about the job losses that accompany the wage increase. In
general, then, the union will bene￿t from labour-saving innovations if it is su¢ ciently wage
oriented. The implication for union resistance to technological change follows directly:
Corollary 1 Su¢ ciently employment oriented trade unions will oppose labour-saving tech-
nological change.
4.2 Flexicurity versus employment protection
Our main objective is to analyse how di⁄erent labour market institutions a⁄ect incentives
for technology adoption. When analysing union incentives, we will refer to ￿￿ as a measure
of union resistance to technological change by applying the following argument: if there
are many union-￿rm pairs in the economy and union preferences are distributed over a
wide range of ￿, some unions will resist new technology while others will endorse it. An
increase (reduction) in ￿￿ then implies that more (fewer) unions will resist technological
progress, implying an overall increase in technology resistance by trade unions.
Our key labour market parameters here are c and b. The degree of employment pro-
tection is directly given by the size of c, while we interpret increased ￿ exicurity as a
combination of lower c and higher b. Doing comparative statics on the utility gain of
technological change, (18), we arrive at the follwing result
Proposition 2 Union resistance to technological change will decrease due to (i) more
employment protection, and/or (ii) a higher reservation wage level.




2￿￿2(￿+1)￿ > 0, implying that @￿￿
@c < 0. (ii)




2￿￿2(￿+1)￿ . Notice that, since ￿￿ ￿ b + c >
￿ ￿ b, ￿ = 0 implies that ￿2 (￿ ￿ b)
￿ > (￿￿ ￿ b + c)
￿. Thus, ￿2 (￿ ￿ b)




@b > 0, at ￿ = ￿￿. Consequently, @￿￿
@b < 0.
With respect to the e⁄ects of di⁄erent labour market institutions on union opposition
to technological change, we see that the picture is somewhat mixed. Increased employment
protection unambiguously reduce union Luddism.14 The reason is that this type of labour
market regulation reduces the downside of technological change for unionised workers,
namely job losses. A policy that reduces the downside of labour-saving innovations while
preserving the upside will generally make unions more technology-friendly.
However, the e⁄ect of increased ￿ exicurity is a priori ambiguous. One leg of this policy
￿less employment protection ￿makes unions less inclined to accept new technology, while
the other leg ￿better outside options ￿has the opposite e⁄ect. The positive e⁄ect of a
higher reservation wage has primarily to do with the labour demand response to better
technology. A higher reservation wage pushes up the union wage level, implying that that
the ￿rm will operate, all else equal, with a smaller labour stock. This makes the labour
demand response to better technology more positive (or less negative), indirectly reducing
the downside of labour-saving innovations for unions.15
5 Endogenous technological change
In the previous section we may have exaggerated the in￿ uence of the union by assuming
that it could block adoption of labour-saving technology as it see ￿t. Here, we contrast
this by presenting a model where the union has no direct in￿ uence over technology. In
14Luddism has come to refer to all sorts of opposition against new technology, but the term refers
historically to the machine-breaking riots in Britain in 1811-12, which purportedly were lead by a ￿ General￿
Ludd.
15There are two counteracting e⁄ects of improved labour productivity on labour demand. On the one
hand, the e⁄ective wage rate (w2=￿) drops, which tends to increase labour demand. On the other hand,
though, fewer workers are needed to produce a given level of output, which tends to reduce labour demand.
The higher the wage elasticity of labour demand, the stronger is the former e⁄ect relative to the latter. See
Dowrick and Spencer (1994) or Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2006) for a more extensive discussion.
14stead, the union has indirect in￿ uence over technology through the fact that the technology
installed by the employer will in turn in￿ uence the wage demands of the union.
We assume that the ￿rm can make an investment in the ￿rst period to improve the
technology in the second period. We then ask how the characteristics of the labour market
institutions ￿given by the parameters c, b, and ￿ ￿a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s incentives to invest in
better technology.
5.1 Certain technological progress
Assume that the ￿rm can make an investment in the ￿rst period that yields a certain
productivity ￿ > 1 in the second period. This investment will be undertaken if the
(certain) payo⁄ is su¢ ciently large to cover the investment costs. Since the ￿rst-period
pro￿t is independent of second-period labour productivity, the investment payo⁄ is given
by the second-period pro￿t di⁄erential ￿￿ := ￿2 ￿ b ￿2. Using the equilibrium expressions
derived in Section 3, this pro￿t gain is given by
￿￿ =
(￿ ￿ 1)(b ￿ c)[2￿￿ ￿ (￿ + 1)(b ￿ c)]
4￿￿2 (￿ + 1)
2 > 0: (19)








(￿ ￿ 1)[￿￿ ￿ (￿ + 1)(b ￿ c)]
2￿￿2 (￿ + 1)










2￿￿2 (￿ + 1)
3 < 0: (21)




Proposition 3 The ￿rm￿ s incentives to invest in better technology decreases with the
degree of employment protection and the union￿ s wage orientation, and increases with the
reservation wage level.
15When unions only have indirect in￿ uence over technology choice (through the way tech-
nology in￿ uences wage setting), the relationship between labour market institutions and
technology adoption is clear-cut. Both lower employment protection and better outside
options for workers give the ￿rm stronger incentives to invest in labour-saving technol-
ogy. Thus, a labour market reform towards more ￿ exicurity is unambiguously positive for
technological change within this framework.
In order to understand the intuition behind these results, notice that technological
progress has two opposite e⁄ects on pro￿ts. First, for a given wage and employment level,
increased productivity increases output and pro￿ts. However, secondly, improved labour
productivity induces a wage increase which, in terms of pro￿ts, is negative. Both of these
partial e⁄ects are a⁄ected by changes in the relevant parameters: c, b and ￿.
Changes in both employment protection and the reservation wage work indirectly
through changes in the equilibrium employment level. Consider ￿rst an increase in em-
ployment protection (c). This reduces second-period employment downsizing, which in-
creases the negative pro￿t e⁄ect of higher wages. In other words, the more costly it is for
the ￿rm to downsize employment, the less attractive it is to install a new labour-saving
technology. Reduced employment downsizing also a⁄ects the direct pro￿t gain of techno-
logical progress (for a given wage level), an e⁄ect that is generally ambiguous. However,
the ￿rst e⁄ect always dominates, reducing the pro￿tability of technological progress for
the ￿rm.
The e⁄ect of a higher reservation wage level is quantitatively similar, but with an
opposite sign. A higher reservation wage pushes up the wage level, leading to a smaller
labour stock, which reduces the negative pro￿t e⁄ect of a (technology-induced) wage in-
crease. The e⁄ects are thus exactly opposite to an increase in employment protection: the
pro￿tability of technological progress increases in b.
A more wage oriented union, on the other hand, reduces the pro￿tability of technolog-
ical progress. An increase in wage orientation (￿) pushes up the wage level and therefore
reduces employment. On the one hand, lower employment reduces the pro￿t loss of higher
16wages. However, on the other hand, the wage response is stronger. It is easily seen from
(11) that a more wage oriented union will enforce a larger wage increase following a tech-
nological progress. Lower employment also a⁄ects the direct pro￿t gain from increased
productivity of the workforce. As previously mentioned, this e⁄ect is, in general, ambigu-
ous. In sum, though, the overall e⁄ect of a more wage oriented union is always negative
with respect to the pro￿t e⁄ect of technological progress. This result clearly resembles the
well-known results by Grout (1984) and Manning (1987) about the investment-deterring
e⁄ects of trade unions.
Finally, notice that more wage oriented unions will reduce union opposition to techno-
logical change, but at the same time reduce ￿rm incentives for technology investments.
5.2 Uncertain technological progress
In addition to the investment that yields a second-period productivity ￿, assume that the
￿rm has also a risky investment option in the ￿rst period. The risky technology investment
yields a second-period productivity ￿ > ￿, but only with a probability ￿ < 1. How does the
labour market characteristics a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s propensity to opt for the risky technology
investment?
Once more, only (expected) second-period pro￿ts matter. The payo⁄ from the safe
investment option is given by ￿2 (￿), while the expected payo⁄ from the risky investment
is given by ￿￿2 (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿2. Assume that both investments are equally costly. Since
￿ > ￿, and since second-period pro￿ts are increasing in labour productivity, the ￿rm will
choose the risky investment if ￿ is su¢ ciently high. We can thus de￿ne a threshold value
of ￿ for which both investment options are equally pro￿table. This value, denoted ￿￿, is
given by
￿￿ =
￿2 (￿ ￿ 1)
￿






(￿(￿ ￿ 2) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1))(b ￿ c) + ￿￿2 (b + 3c)
￿: (22)
It follows that the ￿rm will choose the risky investment if ￿ > ￿￿ and the safe investment
otherwise. Thus, for given levels of ￿ and ￿, we can interpret ￿￿ as an inverse measure of
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Proposition 4 The ￿rm￿ s willingness to undertake risky technology investments is de-
creasing in the degree of employment protection, increasing in the reservation wage level,
and is independent of union preferences.
Due to decreasing marginal revenues, the pro￿t function is concave in labour produc-
tivity. Stronger employment protection shifts down the pro￿t curve and also makes it more
concave, since it is more costly for the ￿rm to optimally adjust the labour stock in response
to technological progress. This makes the ￿rm less willing to invest in risky technology. A
higher reservation wage, on the other hand, also shifts down the pro￿t curve but makes
it less concave, since the marginal pro￿t gain of higher labour productivity increases with
the wage level. Thus, a higher reservation wage makes the ￿rm more willing to invest in
risky technology.
When seen in conjunction with Proposition 3, it appears that a reduction in employ-
ment protection and/or an increase in union reservation wages do not only increase the
￿rm￿ s incentives to invest in better technology, it also makes the ￿rm more willing to take
risks, implying a higher expected technological progress.
6 Concluding remarks
Recent opinion polls indicate that workers in the Nordic countries fear globalisation less
than workers in other rich countries.16 This could of course stem from the fact that
they are better insured against adverse events in the labour markets. But in addition
the ￿ exicurity type labour market arrangements in these countries can have paved the
16Scheve and Slaughter (2006).
18way for structural change and technological improvements. In turn, this could mean that
the bulk of Nordic workers now have high productivity jobs that are less challenged by
globalisation than jobs with less technology content. Annenkov and Madaschi (2005)
document that since the mid-1990s the Nordic EU countries have experienced stronger
labour productivity growth than the larger EU countries. They claim that innovation and
technological changes lie behind this fact. Flexicurity is of course only one element in the
social model that has produced this outcome, but perhaps an important one. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to try to disentangle why adoption of new technology has been so
rapid in Northern Europe. Rather, the purpose of this paper has been to contribute to
this debate by carefully analysing the e⁄ect of social insurance and employment protection
on trade union behaviour, on wages and employment in the industry in question, and on
the union￿ s willingness to accept new technology. The basic ￿ avour of our results is a
con￿rmation that ￿ exicurity is good for change. Notably, trade unionism is important
for this result. The employer side is typically willing to install labour-saving technology.
Organised workers can be harder to persuade. Flexicurity can be important because
it contributes to build down that barrier to technology adoption that trade unions can
represent.
Flexicurity is a two-legged policy, with reduced employment protection and a better
situation for laid-o⁄ workers as the two legs. Of course, the ￿ exicurity package can be
unbundled, and the separate parts can be introduced separately. This paper is not meant
to contain a full cost-bene￿t analysis of the two policy instruments involveld. However, we
have hinted that better outside options for laid-o⁄ workers is the instrument than most
clearly takes care of the ￿ ￿ exibility￿part of ￿ ￿ exicurity￿ . Both ￿rms and unions get to be
more willing to accept labour-saving technology change when outside options are good.
Building down employment protection may be good because employers dare to hire more
people for any given level of technology. Its role to promote more ￿ exible views towards
technological change, though, can less be taken for granted. If workers through their union
has strong direct in￿ uence over technology adoption, they would be more inclined to veto
19labour-saving innovations when employment protection is bad, simply because labour-
saving technology in that case would imply more job losses. This conclusion is changed
if workers only have an indirect in￿ uence over technology, through the way technology
in￿ uences wage demands. Firms like labour-saving more the less employment protection
there is, because then they have a chnace to get more out of a costly investment that is
meant to reduce the number of employees. Unions on their side will in this case increase
the wage they set, but this will not be su¢ cient to overturn the conclusion that also lower
employment protection leads to more adoption of labour-saving technology. So when union
in￿ uence over technology is indirect in this sense, both legs of a ￿ exicurity package is good
for technology adoption. A further result is that with indirect union in￿ uence, ￿rms
will not only want to invest more in labour-saving technology as employment protection
gets more lax, they will also be willing to accept more risks when seeking labour-saving
opportnities.
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